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ABSTRACT
We use a simple model of a closed economy to study the recommendations of monetary policy-
makers, attempting to respond optimally to an asset-price bubble whose stochastic properties they
understand. We focus on the impact which the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates has
on the recommendations of such policy-makers. For a given target inflation rate, we identify several
different forms of `insurance' which policy-makers could potentially take out against encountering
the ZLB due to the future bursting of a bubble. Even with perfect knowledge of the bubble process,
however, which of these will be optimal varies from one type of bubble to another and, for certain
bubbles, from one period to the next. It is therefore difficult to say whether the ZLB should cause
policy-makers to operate policy more tightly or loosely than they would otherwise do, while a bubble
is growing – even after abstracting from the informational difficulties they face in practice. We also
examine the implications of the ZLB for policy-makers’ preferences as to their inflation target.
Policy-makers who wish to avoid concerns about the ZLB should take care not to set too low a target
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iiiMONETARY POLICY, ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES AND THE
ZERO LOWER BOUND
Tim Robinson and Andrew Stone
1. Introduction
In a low inﬂation economy, the bursting of an asset-price bubble can have
signiﬁcant and long-lasting consequences, both for the economy and for the
operation of monetary policy. In Japan, the collapse of a major bubble in property
and stock prices in the early 1990s ushered in over a decade of weak growth and
declining price pressures – culminating, by late 1998, in ongoing consumer price
deﬂation. This, in turn, has seen the Bank of Japan constrained in its actions, for
overﬁveyears,bythezerolowerbound(ZLB)onnominalinterestrates.Likewise,
the tech stock crash in the US in 2000 marked the start of an economic downturn
which saw the year-ended growth rate of the personal consumption expenditure
price index decline brieﬂy to below 1 per cent, and prompted concerns for a time
that the US federal funds rate might also reach the zero lower bound.
These examples suggest, at the very least, that the interaction between asset-price
bubbles and monetary policy is an important one for policy-makers, especially if
operating in a low inﬂation environment. If asset-price bubble collapses represent
a primary mechanism by which otherwise well-functioning economies may
become seriously destabilised, even to the point where monetary policy becomes
constrained by the ZLB, this raises key questions for policy-makers as to how they
might be able to forestall, or at least reduce, the fall-out from such collapses. These
questions relate not just to how policy-makers might wish to react pre-emptively,
as asset-price misalignments develop, but also to choices about the framework
within which policy is set.
This paper uses a simple, stylised two-equation model, due originally to
Ball (1999a) and Svensson (1997), to explore these questions. More precisely,
it builds upon recent work by Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2003), in which the
Ball-Svensson model was augmented by the inclusion of an asset-price bubble.
Gruen et al then used this augmented model to investigate the implications of such
bubbles for optimal policy settings, under a variety of assumptions both about the2
bubble’s stochastic behaviour, and about the degree to which this behaviour can
be inﬂuenced by the actions of policy-makers.
Gruen et al (2003) highlighted two conﬂicting inﬂuences on policy-makers,
attempting to handle a developing bubble. On the one hand, they are likely to
become more conﬁdent as time passes that observed asset-price rises do indeed
constitute a bubble, and so become more willing to respond actively to these
rises. At the same time, however, they would become increasingly conscious of
the negative effects on the economy from the bubble’s eventual bursting – effects
which they would be anxious not to compound, given the delay with which any
ex-post monetary loosening would ﬂow through to real activity.
As a result of these competing inﬂuences, Gruen et al (2003) found that, even with
perfectknowledgebothoftheeconomyandoftheparametersgoverningabubble’s
stochastic behaviour, it may be unclear whether policy-makers would wish to
tighten policy in the face of such a bubble, beyond the degree to which they would
do so based on an efﬁcient markets view of asset prices. Their results highlighted
the stringent information requirements therefore inherent in a pre-emptive policy
approachtoasset-pricebubbles–andtheneedfordelicatejudgements,inpursuing
such a strategy, about both the process driving the bubble and its likely sensitivity
to monetary policy.
In this paper we extend the work of Gruen et al by removing one simpliﬁcation
built into their modelling approach. This was the assumption that, whenever the
economy is struck by a large negative shock, such as the bursting of an asset-price
bubble, policy-makers can set the real interest rate as far below neutral as desired,
regardless of the current level of inﬂation. This is equivalent to assuming that, at
all times, the nominal interest rate may be set arbitrarily, so ignoring the ZLB.
By contrast, in this paper we impose a zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates, as a constraint on the actions of policy-makers attempting to deal with a
developing asset-price bubble. We then examine the implications this has both: for
the behaviour of policy-makers who believe that they understand the stochastic
properties of the bubble; and for the policy framework within which they must
make their decisions.
With regard to the former, policy-makers who wish to react pre-emptively to a
growing bubble must now take into account whether their current actions might3
result in them being unable to set the real interest rate optimally in subsequent
periods, whenever the bubble bursts. Moreover, in doing so, they must allow for
thepossibilitynotmerelythattheiractionsmightbecomeconstrainedintheperiod
in which the bubble actually bursts, but also that this might occur with a lag (as
the bubble’s collapse ﬂows through to lower inﬂation, so reducing the amount by
which the real interest rate can be set below neutral).
1
As regards the latter issue, with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
the level of inﬂation immediately prior to an asset-price bubble collapse clearly
becomes important. Hence, this constraint may inﬂuence decisions about aspects
of the policy framework itself, such as policy-makers’ preferred choice of target
inﬂation rate.
2. Methodology
2.1 The augmented Ball-Svensson Model
The starting point for our analysis is a simple model of a closed economy, due to
Ball (1999a) and Svensson (1997). This model is described by 2 equations:
yt = −βrt−1+λyt−1 (1)
πt = πt−1+αyt−1 (2)
where y is the output gap, r is the difference between the real interest rate and its
neutral level, π is the difference between consumer-price inﬂation and its targeted
rate, and α, β, and λ are positive constants (with λ ≤ 1 so that output gaps do not
behave explosively with real interest rates at neutral).
As noted in Gruen et al (2003), the Ball-Svensson model ‘has the advantage of
simplicity and intuitive appeal. ...It assumes, realistically, that monetary policy
1 Note that our focus in this paper is on the effect which these possibilities (i.e. the presence of
the ZLB) might have on the interest rate recommendations of policy-makers, over and above
whatever direct impact the presence of the bubble itself might have on these recommendations
in the absence of the ZLB. Note also that our focus on the impact of the ZLB on policy-makers’
thinking while a bubble is still growing is in contrast to much of the recent research on the ZLB,
which has focussed on how policy-makers should react once the ZLB has been reached. A brief
review of where this paper sits within the recent literature on both asset-price bubbles and the
ZLB is provided in Appendix A.4
affects real output, and hence the output gap, with a lag, and that the output gap
affects inﬂation with a further lag’. We adopt the same baseline values for the
parameters α, β, and λ as those chosen by Ball, for the case where each period in
the model corresponds to one year, namely α = 0.4, β = 1 and λ = 0.8.
2
Next, following Gruen et al (2003), we augment the model with an asset-price
bubble.
3 We assume that in year 0, the economy is in equilibrium, with both output
and inﬂation at their target values, y0 = π0 = 0 , and that the bubble has zero size,
a0 = 0. In subsequent years, we assume that the bubble evolves as follows:
at =

at−1+γt , with probability 1− pt
0 , with probability pt .
(3)
Thus, in each year, the bubble either grows by an amount, γt > 0, or bursts and
collapses back to zero. We also assume that, once the bubble has burst, it does
not re-form. To allow for the effect of the bubble on the economy, we modify the
Ball-Svensson model to read:
yt = −βrt−1+λyt−1+Dat (4)
πt = πt−1+αyt−1. (5)
In each year that the bubble is growing it has an expansionary effect on the
economy, increasing the level of output, and the output gap, by γt. The bubble is,
however, assumed to have no direct effect on consumer-price inﬂation, although
there will be consequences for inﬂation to the extent that the bubble leads the
2 Note that these parameter values were actually calibrated by Ball to ﬁt the US economy,
based on previous studies by himself (Ball 1994), DeLong and Summers (1988) and
Rudebusch (1995). Ball (1999b) also subsequently took these same base parameter values
for use in an open-economy version of the model which he noted was ‘meant to apply to
medium-to-small open economies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ (although an
increase in the real interest rate, for example, affects output through two channels in this open
economy model – directly and via the exchange rate – rather than just via the former channel).
Finally, Ball and Svensson also added white-noise shocks to each of their equations, which we
have suppressed for simplicity.
3 The discussion of Equations (3), (4) and (5) below directly mimics that of Gruen et al (2003)
initially, but is augmented with a discussion of the rationale for some of the notable features
of these equations, such as the absence of any forward-looking component to the inﬂation
expectations formation process embodied in Equation (5).5
economy to operate with excess demand as it expands, and with excess supply
when it bursts. When the bubble bursts, the effect on the economy is, of course,
contractionary: if the bubble bursts in year t, the direct effect on output, and the
output gap, in that year will be Dat = −
Pt−1
1 γt. Thus, the longer the bubble
survives, the greater will be the contractionary effect on the economy when it
bursts.
Equations (3), (4) and (5) describe the model used by Gruen et al (2003), and
adopted again here. In a moment we shall want to also incorporate a ZLB on the
nominal interest rate into the model, but before doing so it is worth remarking on
a number of aspects of the model so far.
The most notable feature of Equations (3), (4) and (5) is that the treatment of
both the asset-price bubbles and the structure of the economy is deliberately
kept extremely simple and stylised. For example, the model allows for no
forward-looking element in the formation of inﬂation expectations, so limiting the
scope for monetary policy to inﬂuence the economy through pre-commitment to a
particular monetary policy path or approach. Furthermore, the asset-price bubbles
in the model are treated in a simple, reduced-form fashion, in terms of their impact
on real activity, without any attempt to model the bubble formation process itself.
The reason for these choices is that much of the discussion about how monetary
policy should react to asset-price bubbles focusses on the extreme informational
difﬁculties that policy-makers face in determining the properties of a given bubble
(current size, likelihood of collapse), or whether a bubble even exists. These
informational difﬁculties are often cited as a principal reason why an activist
approach to monetary policy in the face of asset-price misalignments might be
difﬁcultorsub-optimalinpractice.However,byusingahighlysimpliﬁedmodelof
the economy, in which policy-makers are also endowed with full knowledge of the
stochastic properties of a developing asset-price bubble, Gruen et al (2003) were
able to abstract from these informational issues. By doing so, they were able to
demonstrate that there are other factors, besides informational constraints, which
complicate an approach of actively responding to asset-price bubbles – to the point
of sometimes making it problematic even to know whether policy ought to be set
more tightly or more loosely than it would otherwise be, absent the bubble.
Our adoption in this paper of the same simpliﬁed modelling framework as
Gruen et al (2003) should be viewed in the same spirit. In particular, the reason6
that we do not attempt to provide a more explicit or detailed model of asset prices
in this paper is simply that doing so is not a focus of the paper. Rather, extending
the work of Gruen et al, we wish to study whether or not it is clear-cut in what way
the presence of a ZLB on nominal interest rates would inﬂuence policy-makers,
attempting to handle a developing asset-price bubble, even when in possession of a
good understanding of the stochastic properties of the bubble’s likely future impact
on the real economy. The same rationale applies to our choice of a simple and
transparent modelling framework which excludes any forward-looking element to
the inﬂation expectations formation process. Excluding such an element does not
indicate that the management of future expectations might not be an important
tool in the armoury of a central bank, especially as the economy approached the
ZLB. Rather, it simply reﬂects that our aim in this paper is to highlight other
factors which would – even were such management of future expectations possible
– still complicate the task of policy-makers trying to determine how, optimally, to
respond actively to a developing bubble.
4
Returning to the model itself, last but not least we introduce a zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate into the model described by Equations (3), (4) and (5).
It is at this point that our treatment diverges from that in Gruen et al (2003).
In Gruen et al the simplifying assumption is made that policy-makers control the
real interest rate, rather than the nominal one, and that this real interest rate can be
adjusted arbitrarily, in response to shocks to the economy. Here we drop this latter
assumption and require, instead, that the real interest rate never be such that the
corresponding level of the nominal rate would be negative.







t for the respective levels of the real interest rate, nominal interest rate
and rate of inﬂation.
5 Then, writing r
∗, i
∗ and π
∗ for the corresponding neutral or
4 Note that the preceding paragraphs represent a response to some of the issues, regarding the
modelling framework adopted in the paper, raised by participants at the 15th Annual East Asian
Seminar on Economics, held in Tokyo in June 2003, at which this paper was presented.
5 Variables with a ‘lvl’ superscript thus represent levels variables, while those without a ‘lvl’
superscript continue to denote the deviations of these levels variables from their neutral or
target values.7




t ≥ 0 (6)
while the following four identities, primarily relating real and nominal variables,




















∗+rt +πt . (10)
2.2 Activist and sceptical policy-makers
Equations (3) to (10) summarise our Ball-Svensson economy, experiencing an
asset-price bubble, and subject to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Returning to the framework employed by Gruen et al (2003), we next introduce
two different types of policy-maker: sceptics, who don’t try to second-guess
asset-price developments, and activists, who believe that they understand enough
about asset-price bubbles to set policy actively in response to them.
Todrawthedistinctionmoreprecisely,bothtypesofpolicy-makerunderstandhow
the output gap and inﬂation evolve over time, as summarised by Equations (4) and
(5). Activists also understand, and respond optimally to, the stochastic behaviour
of the bubble, as summarised by Equation (3). Sceptics, by contrast, respond to
asset-bubble shocks, Dat, when they arrive, but assume that the expected value of
future shocks is zero.
Such sceptics should not, however, be thought of as naive or ignorant for adopting
this position. As an asset-price bubble grows, there is always disagreement about
whether the observed asset-price developments constitute a bubble, in which case
expectations about future asset-price changes may be non-zero, or are instead
consistent with an efﬁcient market, in which case the expected value of future8
changes in the asset price is zero.
6 In holding that the expected value of future
asset-price shocks is zero, sceptical policy-makers in our framework should
therefore simply be viewed as believers in the efﬁcient markets hypothesis.
Continuing, we assume that policy-makers observe in each year whether the
bubble has grown further, or collapsed, before setting the interest rate for that
year. Given the nature of the lags in the model, this year’s interest rate will have
no impact on real activity until next year, and on inﬂation until the year after that.
We also assume that our two types of policy-maker have the same preferences, and
care about the volatility of both inﬂation and output. Explicitly, we thus assume
that in each year t, policy-makers (whether activist or sceptic) recommend the
real interest rate, rt, which will minimise the weighted sum of the expected future












where µ is the relative weight on the deviations of inﬂation and Et is the
policy-maker’s year t expectation. For the baseline results in this paper we set
6 In the late 1990s, precisely this debate was occurring within the US Federal Reserve in relation
to the US stock market, as the following quotation from Stephen Cecchetti makes clear.
From August 1997 to June 1999 I sat on the backbench at the meetings of
the FOMC and received all of the material distributed to the participants. ... The
interesting thing is that during the period when I took part in this process, the
Board staff preparing the forecasts invariably assumed that the US stock market
would decline signiﬁcantly – 10 to 20 per cent declines in the Wilshire 5000 index
were commonly the basis for the forecasts. They clearly believed that the stock
market was overvalued. ...
At the time this was all happening, I confess that I was scandalised. I regularly
rantedaboutthepracticeofforecastingadramaticdeclineinthestockmarket.Like
the vast majority of academics, I adhered to the efﬁcient markets view. ... while
we needed to assume something about the stock market, shouldn’t we assume the
equity index would stay constant at its current level indeﬁnitely? ...
This happened ﬁve years ago (which is why I can talk about it now), and in the
interim I have changed many of my views. (Cecchetti 2003)
Sceptical policymakers in our framework may be characterised as those who adhere to the
approach of Cecchetti – before his change of view!9
µ = 1, so that policy-makers are assumed to care equally about deviations of
inﬂation from target and of output from potential.
Finally, in the absence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, it is
possibletowritedownexplicitlytheformthatoptimalpolicywilltakeforasceptic
in our Ball-Svensson economy.











/2. For our baseline
parameter values, this becomes
rt = 1.13yt +0.82πt (13)
which is a more aggressive Taylor rule than the ‘standard’ one introduced by
Taylor (1993), rt = 0.5yt +0.5πt.
In the presence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, however, it
may not be possible for a sceptic (or an activist, after the bubble has burst) to
recommend policy in accordance with Equation (12). Instead, optimal policy for












t denotes the value of rt which corresponds to i
lvl





3. How Might the Zero Lower Bound Inﬂuence an Activist
Policymaker?
In Section 4 we describe our empirical results as to how the presence of a zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates inﬂuences the policy recommendations
of an activist policy-maker, confronting a developing asset-price bubble. We
7 This reﬂects that, in the absence of the zero lower bound, certainty equivalence holds in the
model, for a policy-maker who expects no future asset-price driven shocks to output. Such
policy-makers in fact include not only sceptics in each period, but also activists once the bubble
bursts (since it is assumed never to re-form).10
also explore the implications of these results for policy questions such as the
appropriate choice of inﬂation target, and how this may depend on key economic
parameters which may vary from country to country.
Before turning to these empirical results, however, it is instructive to ask:
what effect, intuitively, would we expect the existence of the ZLB to have
on an activist policy-maker, weighing how best to respond to an asset-price
bubble? In the remainder of this section, we address this question in two stages:
ﬁrst for asset-price bubbles whose development (period-to-period growth and/or
probability of bursting) is completely exogenous; and secondly for asset-price
bubbles whose development can be inﬂuenced by policy.
Note that our focus here, and throughout what follows, is on the marginal effect
which the ZLB might have on an activist policy-maker, over and above whatever
impact the bubble itself would have even in the absence of a ZLB on nominal
interest rates. Thus, when we refer to the ZLB causing an activist to (say)
loosen policy in a given period, we are not necessarily implying that they would
recommend policy which is actually looser than a sceptic in that period. Rather,
we mean simply that they would recommend policy, in that period, which is not
as tight as they would otherwise recommend, were there no ZLB.
3.1 The case of bubbles whose development is exogenous
Consider an asset-price bubble whose period-to-period growth and probability of
bursting are entirely exogenous, unaffected by monetary policy. Suppose also that
an activist policy-maker understands that he is powerless to inﬂuence the future
trajectory of this bubble.
As such a bubble grows, the activist appreciates the increasing risk that, in the
future, its eventual bursting will generate a large negative shock to output and,
thereafter, to inﬂation, which might result in the activist’s preferred post-bubble
policy recommendations striking the ZLB. This latter effect could occur either:
immediately,iftheoutputgapisdrivensufﬁcientlynegativetoresultintheoptimal
nominal interest rate falling below zero in the period of the bubble’s collapse; or
in subsequent periods, as the shock to output ﬂows into lower inﬂation (or even
deﬂation), so that a lower nominal interest rate is required to reach a desired real
interest rate setting.11
Such a situation, in which the policy-maker’s capacity to stabilise the economy
would be constrained, would clearly be sub-optimal. Indeed, in the extreme, it
might even result in the economy entering a deﬂationary spiral from which, owing
to the ZLB, monetary policy alone would be unable to rescue it. Intuitively,
therefore, an activist policy-maker would prefer to prevent such an outcome
arising in the future – even at some deﬁnite present cost in terms of their loss
function, Equation (11).
In our Ball-Svensson model, however, the only available defence against such
an outcome, for an exogenous bubble, is to recommend policy so as to raise
both the output gap and inﬂation a little, relative to what would otherwise be
optimal in the absence of the ZLB. Such a cushion of extra output and inﬂation
would reduce the likelihood of policy subsequently striking the ZLB, either in the
immediateaftermathofthebubble’scollapse,orinsubsequentperiods.Hence,one
would expect an activist policy-maker, concerned about the ZLB, to be marginally
less hawkish than otherwise, when deciding how best to deal with a developing
exogenous asset-price bubble.
This intuition may be neatly illustrated using a phase diagram for the
Ball-Svensson model introduced by Reifschneider and Williams (2000). This
phase diagram depicts how (yt,πt)-space may be sub-divided into three distinct
regions, in each of which monetary policy has a differing capacity to return the
economy to steady state (output at potential and inﬂation at target), in the absence
of future shocks. This phase diagram is shown in Figure 1 below, for the case
where α, β, λ and µ take their baseline values. A detailed derivation of this phase
diagram, which differs from that provided by Reifschneider and Williams (2000),
is set out in Appendix B.
In Region I, monetary policy is able to return the economy to steady state (absent
future shocks), without ever striking the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates. By contrast, in Region II, monetary policy is still able to return the economy
to steady state (absent future shocks), but is initially constrained in doing so by the
ZLB – so that the economy’s path back to (yt,πt) = (0,0) would be sub-optimal
(higher loss), relative to that which could be achieved if nominal interest rates
were not bounded below. Finally, in Region III, monetary policy alone is unable
to prevent the economy entering a catastrophic deﬂationary spiral. Such a fate
could only be able to be averted by the advent, as a supplement to expansionary12



















































































ZLB does not constrain policy
Notes: Phase diagram for the case where the parameters α, β, γ and µ take their baseline values.
Line 1 passes through the point (0,−i
∗
n ) and has approximate slope −0.54. Line 2 passes
through the point (0,−0.55i
∗
n ) and has approximate slope −0.62.
monetary settings, of sufﬁciently powerful future positive shocks to the economy:
either exogenous, such as a boom in world growth; or generated through other
arms of policy, such as a ﬁscal expansion.
Now consider again an activist policy-maker in our Ball-Svensson economy,
confronted with a developing exogenous asset-price bubble, and with no policy
tools at his disposal other than the interest rate. Clearly, he will wish to take
whatever steps are necessary to prevent the economy ever entering Region III –13
since this would inescapably result in devastating future losses. He will also prefer
to keep the economy from entering Region II, since in this region the ZLB would
prevent output and inﬂation from being returned to steady state as efﬁciently as
possible, so incurring additional costs in terms of his loss function, Equation (11).
If we combine these observations with the fact that, whenever the bubble does
burst, the nature of the resultant shock to the economy will be to shift it
horizontally to the left in (yt,πt)-space, by an amount equal to the size of the
bubble, then the incentives for our activist policy-maker become clear. To ensure
that the economy never enters Region III, and to also keep it out of Region II if
possible, he will prefer to recommend policy, while the bubble survives, which
pushes the economy up and to the right in (yt,πt)-space, relative to what he would
recommend were there no ZLB. Moreover, he will prefer this even if it may take
the economy further away from steady state at (yt,πt) = (0,0), and so incur an
immediate cost in terms of his loss function, Equation (11).
Finally, Figure 1 also highlights two further points about the extent to which
the ZLB will inﬂuence an activist policy-maker’s interest rate recommendations.
The ﬁrst is that, the bigger the current size of the bubble, the further such
a policy-maker will wish to push the economy upwards and to the right in
(yt,πt)-space, to minimise its chances of being driven into Regions II or III
whenever the bubble does collapse. Hence, the bigger the current size of the
bubble, the greater will be the inﬂuence which the ZLB will have on an activist’s
policy recommendations.
The second point rests on the observation that the locations of the boundary lines
separating Regions II and III from the rest of (yt,πt)-space are both determined
by the level of the neutral nominal interest rate, i
∗. The higher is i
∗, the further
these boundary lines will be pushed down and to the left, away from the origin
in (yt,πt)-space. Hence, the higher is i
∗, the less of a concern will the risk of
entering Regions II or III be to an activist policy-maker – and so the less will such
a policy-maker feel the need to recommend interest rate settings, while the bubble
survives, which hold both the output gap and inﬂation higher than they would
otherwise prefer.
This latter point is, of course, simply another way of saying that the higher are
both the neutral real rate of interest in the economy and the target rate of inﬂation,
the less of a factor will the ZLB be in the minds of policy-makers, when dealing14
with an asset-price bubble. Hence, while there are clearly costs associated with
operating the economy at too high an average inﬂation rate, policy-makers may
also wish to take care not to adopt too low a ﬁgure when deciding upon an inﬂation
target – especially if the neutral real interest rate in their economy is relatively low.
3.2 The case of bubbles whose development is affected by policy
For an entirely exogenous asset-price bubble, we have just seen that the presence
of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates provides an incentive to an activist
policy-maker to recommend somewhat looser policy than otherwise, so as to shift
the economy upwards and to the right in (yt,πt)-space. The optimal extent of such
insurance against striking the ZLB will be greater the larger is the current size of
the bubble, and the lower is the economy’s neutral nominal interest rate in steady
state.
For a bubble whose development (period-to-period growth and/or probability
of bursting) is affected by policy, however, the situation is no longer so clear.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a bubble whose probability of bursting next period is
increased (decreased) by setting policy more tightly (loosely) in the current period.
In this event, although the marginal effect of loosening policy would be to shift
the economy away from Regions II and III in (yt,πt)-space, it would also be to
increase the odds of the bubble surviving and growing next period, so posing a
greaterriskdownthetrack. Hence,thedirectioninwhichtheZLBwould inﬂuence
the recommendations of an activist policy-maker is no longer clear-cut. Indeed, for
a bubble which was very sensitive to policy, one could imagine the ZLB providing
an incentive for an activist policy-maker to raise interest rates decisively early in
the bubble’s life – in the hope of bursting it before it could grow sufﬁciently to
pose a serious threat to the stability of the economy upon its collapse.
A similar story holds for the case of a bubble whose period-to-period growth,
while it survives, may be inﬂuenced by policy. Suppose that an activist
policy-maker knows that the bubble’s growth next period, if it survives, will be
reduced (increased) by setting policy more tightly (loosely) in the current period.
In this event, loosening policy in any given period would again have the effect of
shifting the economy away from Regions II and III in (yt,πt)-space – by a greater
amount, indeed, should the bubble survive, than the same loosening would achieve15
in the case of a purely exogenous bubble. However, it would also have the effect
of further boosting the size of the bubble, in the event that it did not burst next
period, hence increasing the size of the negative shock to the economy whenever
the bubble ultimately does burst. Hence, once again, the direction in which the
presence of a ZLB on nominal interest rates would, at the margin, push an activist
policy-maker in this situation is no longer clear.
3.3 An insurance interpretation for the implications of the ZLB
The observations in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 may be neatly summarised in terms of
the phase diagram, Figure 1, and an ‘insurance’ paradigm for thinking about how
the presence of a ZLB on nominal interest rates might inﬂuence the thinking of an
activist policy-maker. As illustrated in Figure 1, the presence of a ZLB creates two
zones in (yt,πt)-space, Regions II and III, which an activist policy-maker will be
either desperate (Region III) or at least anxious (Region II) to keep the economy
away from. As an asset-price bubble grows, such a policy-maker will therefore
wish to take out some insurance against the economy being driven into either of
these regions, whenever the bubble ﬁnally does collapse.
For the case of an exogenous bubble, the only such insurance which an activist can
set out to purchase – that is, obtain at some deﬁnite cost in terms of their objective
function, Equation (11) – is to manoeuvre the economy upwards and to the right
in (yt,πt)-space, by recommending policy be set more loosely than otherwise.
For a bubble whose development (period-to-period growth and/or probability of
bursting) is affected by policy, however, alternative potential forms of insurance
are available, besides this standard type. If the bubble’s probability of bursting is
inﬂuenced by policy, this alternative insurance takes the form of increasing the
odds that the bubble will collapse while it is still young, before it has grown big
enough to drive the economy into Regions II or III through its collapse. If instead
the bubble’s growth may be curtailed by running policy more tightly, it takes the
form of restraining the potential future size of the bubble, so as to again ensure
that the negative shock which the bubble imparts upon bursting will not be large
enough to drive the economy into Regions II or III.
In both these latter cases, these alternative forms of insurance entail setting policy
more tightly than otherwise, rather than more loosely, as was the case for the
standardformofinsurance.Forendogenousbubbles,therefore,itisnolongerclear16
a priori which form of insurance an activist policy-maker will prefer to purchase,
and therefore in which direction the ZLB will alter his policy recommendations.
This will depend upon the relative costliness of the different forms of insurance
available – which will, in turn, vary from period to period, reﬂecting the state in
which the activist ﬁnds the economy (i.e. current output gap and inﬂation rate, as
well as current size of the bubble) when deciding his preferred policy settings.
4. Results
In this section we present the optimal policy recommendations of activist and
sceptical policy-makers, through time, in the presence of an asset-price bubble. As
noted in Section 2, we focus on the period while the bubble survives and grows.
Once the bubble bursts, both activists and sceptics in our Ball-Svensson model
will always agree on an approach of aggressively easing policy, to counteract the
contractionary effects of the bust.
As in Gruen et al (2003), we wish to examine the optimal policy recommendations
of sceptics and activists over a range of plausible alternative assumptions about
the stochastic nature of the bubble. To do so meaningfully, it is necessary that
the two policy-makers face an economy in the same state in each year. Since
the current state of the economy depends on previous policy settings (as well
as on the evolution of the bubble) we will assume throughout that the policy
settings that are actually implemented each year are those chosen by the sceptic.
We can then sensibly compare, as each year passes, the current optimal policy
recommendations made by the different policy-makers.
The activist’s recommendations will depend on the assumptions he makes about
the future possible paths of the bubble. In particular, they will reﬂect the shocks
implicit in these paths, and how these shocks interact with both: his preferences,
as reﬂected in his loss function, Equation (11); and the potential constraint on
his future actions embodied in the ZLB. By contrast, the recommendations of
the sceptic – being a believer in the efﬁcient markets hypothesis – will reﬂect
an expectation of no future shocks to the economy ﬂowing from asset-price
movements.17
4.1 Baseline Results: The Case of Exogenous Bubbles
We begin with results for the baseline case where: the bubble’s future development
is unaffected by policy-makers’ actions; its direct expansionary effect on output
in each year of its growth is a constant 1 per cent (γt = 1); its period-to-period
probability of bursting is a constant 40 per cent (pt = p
∗ = 0.4); and the model
and loss function parameters α,β,λ and µ take their baseline values speciﬁed
earlier.
8,9 In subsequent subsections we will examine the effect of varying each of
these sets of assumptions.
10
Figure 2 shows the optimal policy recommendations made, in each period, by the
sceptic and two activists, assuming that the steady-state neutral nominal interest
rate in the economy is i
∗ = 3 per cent.
11 The two activists differ in the way
that their actions are inﬂuenced by the ZLB. For the ﬁrst, the ZLB is a genuine
constraint on policy, as encapsulated by Equation (6). For the (hypothetical)
8 Recall that these baseline values are α = 0.4, β = 1.0, λ = 0.8 and µ = 1.0. Note also
that, to ease the process of numerically determining optimal paths of contingent policy
recommendations for an activist policy-maker in each period, we actually make the simplifying
assumption here and in all subsequent scenarios that, if the bubble survives until year 14
(which is an extremely unlikely event for all the parameter values we consider), then it bursts
with certainty in that year. Hence, strictly speaking, our assumption regarding pt here is that
pt = p
∗ = 0.4 for all t = 0,1,...,13, while p14 = 1.
9 For reference, if pt were 0.4 for all t this would imply an average remaining life for the bubble
of two and a half years. However, since pt =0.4 here only fort =0,1,...,13, with p14 =1, our
exogenous bubble in this subsection has an expected remaining life in period 0 of just under
two and a half years.
10 A variation which we do not examine in the main body of the paper, but which we take up
in Appendix C, is the case of rational bubbles. As discussed in Gruen et al (2003), there is a
sense in which the baseline bubble just described could, under plausible assumptions about the
relationship between the price growth underlying an asset bubble and the impact of that bubble
on the real economy, be regarded as irrational. While we do not see this as a shortcoming per
se – since there is much evidence in developed economies of irrational bubbles occurring in
practice (see, for example, Shiller (2000)) – it is nevertheless interesting to examine whether
the imposition of a rationality assumption on our bubbles would affect the overall thrust of our




∗, this might represent an economy where the neutral real rate, r
∗, is
2 per cent, and target inﬂation, π
∗, is 1 per cent; or where r
∗ = 3 per cent and π
∗ = 0 per cent;
or any other such combination.18
second, the zero lower bound is not a constraint, so that a negative nominal interest
rate setting can (in some unspeciﬁed way) be achieved, if desired.
Figure 2: Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the Bubble Survives
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(ZLB)
Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates are deviations from neutral.
The main features of Figure 2 – the shapes of the paths recommended by the
sceptic and the ‘no ZLB’ activist; and the fact that the recommendations of this
activist, while initially above those of the sceptic, subsequently drop below them
– were discussed in Gruen et al (2003). We refer the reader to that paper for
a detailed analysis of the policy implications of these features, and an intuitive
explanation of them (in terms of the interaction between the future possible effects
of the bubble on output, and the lag with which policy affects the economy).
Our focus in this paper, however, is on the difference between the two sets of
activist policy recommendations shown in Figure 2. This difference captures
the impact of the presence of the ZLB on an activist policy-maker’s preferred
recommendations. Two characteristics of this difference stand out. First, as
anticipated in Section 3, for an exogenous bubble the effect of the zero lower19
bound is indeed to make an activist reduce his policy recommendations in each
period, at the margin, relative to what he would have recommended were there
no ZLB. Secondly, even for an economy with a low steady-state neutral nominal
interest rate of i
∗ = 3 per cent, this effect is, however, very small at ﬁrst – and
remains so, at least until such time as the bubble has become quite large.
12
We can explore these latter two observations further, by considering how the
impact of the ZLB on an activist policy-maker varies with the level of the
steady-state neutral nominal interest rate in the economy, i
∗. Figure 3 below shows
thedifferencebetweenthepolicyrecommendationsofactivistpolicy-makers,with
and without a zero lower bound constraint, for i
∗ = 1, 2, 3, 5.5 and 8 per cent.
13
We see that for neutral nominal interest rates around or above the range currently
estimated for Australia, the ZLB is not a factor in an activist policy-maker’s
thinking, even for quite large bubbles. By contrast, in an economy with an
extremely low steady-state neutral nominal interest rate, such as i
∗ = 1 or 2,
the ZLB would start to become a serious factor in an activist policy-maker’s
considerations even for small to moderate sized bubbles.
14
We now examine how these observations vary across a range of alternative
assumptions about either the stochastic properties of our asset-price bubbles, or
about the model parameters α, β and λ.
4.2 Exogenous Bubbles with Different Probabilities of Bursting
Theresults inFigure2suggest that,foran exogenousbubblewith period-to-period
probability of bursting pt = p
∗ = 0.4, the ZLB is not a major factor in an activist
policy-maker’s considerations, unless the steady-state neutral nominal interest rate
12 It is not until period 6 that an activist, in such an economy, would feel the need to lower his
policy recommendation by 25 basis points on account of concern about the ZLB.
13 The choice of i
∗ = 5.5 per cent is covered to include a case in the plausible range of values for
Australia: corresponding to, say, a neutral real interest rate of 3 per cent and an inﬂation target
of 2.5 per cent, the mid-point of the 2 to 3 per cent medium-term target band. This value also
lies neatly in the middle of the 5 to 6 per cent range in which most current estimates of the
neutral nominal interest rate for Australia fall. The choices i
∗ = 1 and 2 per cent are included
to show the increasingly severe impact of the ZLB on an activist policy-maker’s considerations,
when the neutral nominal rate is extremely low.20
Figure 3: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations








































i* = 5.5 and i* = 8.0
% %
Year
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i* = 3.0
Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
14 There is a technical caveat which should be borne in mind in relation to the results reported
in Figures 2 and 3. This relates to the fact that the presence of the ZLB on nominal interest
rates results in an activist policy-maker’s expected loss ceasing to be a quadratic function of
his contingent policy recommendations. This means that, in each period, not only must we
resort to numerical methods to seek an activist’s loss minimising proﬁle of contingent policy
recommendations, but we must also be concerned about the possibility of inadvertently locating
a local rather than global minimum. To help overcome this potential problem we adopted the
following safeguards throughout the simulations reported in this paper. First, we set up the loss
minimisation process using two different algorithms, to provide a cross-check on our results.
Secondly, having located notionally optimal sets of contingent policy recommendations for
each period, in a given scenario, we then subjected these proﬁles to random perturbations,
to see whether re-optimisation starting from these perturbed settings would return the original
proﬁle, or instead give rise to an alternative with lower expected loss. Finally, these perturbation
tests were separately carried out in various instances by each author, to try to maximise variety
in the alterations tested. To the extent that these safeguards may have failed in any particular
instance, this would simply highlight the practical difﬁculties facing an activist policy-maker
in trying to determine how to respond optimally to a developing asset-price bubble in such
circumstances, even with perfect knowledge about both the structure of the economy and the
stochastic properties of the bubble!21
in the economy is extremely low. It is interesting to ask whether this remains so as
we vary the constant probability of bursting, p
∗.
For small values of p
∗, the probability that the bubble will continue to grow to a
large size, rather than burst in the near term, increases. We would therefore expect
that, the smaller the value of p
∗, the greater would be the importance of the ZLB
in an activist policy-maker’s thinking, as a possible constraint on future action.
Figure 4: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
Sensitivity to alternative values for p*, i* = 3.0
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Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
As Figure 4 shows, this is indeed what we ﬁnd. For an exogenous bubble whose
period-to-period probability of bursting is pt = p
∗ = 0.2, the impact of the ZLB
on an activist’s recommendations is apparent both earlier and more forcefully than
in the case where pt = p
∗ = 0.4.
15,16 Nevertheless, the scale of this ‘ZLB effect’
15 Note that an activist’s policy recommendations themselves are, however, tighter in every period
for a bubble with pt = p
∗ = 0.2 than for a bubble with pt = p
∗ = 0.4. This is true with or
without the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates – for the case without the ZLB constraint
see Gruen et al (2003), Figure 2.22
is not very large in either case, nor is it dramatically different between the two
cases, at least until the bubble has become quite large.
4.3 Bubbles whose Growth is Affected by Policy
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we considered only purely exogenous asset-price bubbles.
A natural extension is to assume that, by setting tighter policy this year,
policy-makers can reduce the extent of the bubble’s growth next year, if it survives.
Explicitly,weassumeonceagainthat pt = p
∗ =0.4(except p14 =1),butthatnow,






t , t ≥ 0, denotes the optimal path chosen by a sceptical policy-maker
while the bubble survives, assuming γt = 1; and φ is a sensitivity parameter to be
chosen.
17 For the results which follow we assume φ = 1, so that by setting policy
1 percentage point higher than the sceptic this year, the bubble’s growth next year





survives. Two of these activists differ in their assumptions about the sensitivity
16 The ‘ZLB effect’ is around 25 basis points by year 4, and 50 basis points by year 5, when
p
∗ = 0.2, whereas it is not until year 6 that it even reaches 25 basis points when p
∗ = 0.4.
17 We choose the functional form in Equation (16) so that, for the benchmark policy settings
chosen by the sceptic, γt = 1 for all t, as in the exogenous bubble case. Note also that in
Equation (16) the growth of the bubble this period depends upon last period’s interest rate.
An interesting variant, suggested to us by Kenneth Kuttner, would be to allow for monetary
policy to have a contemporaneous impact on asset prices (while continuing to affect the
output gap directly with a one-period lag). If suitably incorporated, such a change might
allow policy-makers to provide a brake on the fall of asset prices, whenever a bubble burst,
so cushioning the impact of the burst on aggregate demand. Of course, knowledge that the
monetary authorities might behave in this way might, however, risk creating a moral hazard
problem, along the lines of the so-called ‘Greenspan put’ discussed in relation to the recent
tech stock boom and bust in the US. For reasons of space, we do not pursue these various issues
further here.
18 To continue holding the bubble’s growth to zero, while it survives, would of course require
policy to be set 1 percentage point higher than the sceptic in each such period – with the usual
consequences of tight policy for both output and inﬂation.23
parameter φ, with one assuming no interest-rate sensitivity, φ = 0, while the
other assumes high sensitivity, φ = 1. The third, for reference, is a hypothetical
policy-maker who also assumes high sensitivity (φ = 1), but is unconstrained by
the ZLB.
Figure 5: Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the Bubble Survives
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Activist
Activist
(φ  = 0, ZLB)
Activist
(φ  = 1, ZLB)
(φ  = 1, no ZLB)
Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates are deviations from neutral.
As discussed in Gruen et al (2003), we see ﬁrst that being able to inﬂuence
the growth of the bubble makes an activist policy-maker increase their policy
recommendations in each period from year 1 onwards, relative to what they would
advise were they unable to inﬂuence the bubble’s growth. However, the impact of
the ZLB is still to reduce such an activist’s policy recommendations, relative to
what they would prefer in the absence of the ZLB. Moreover, this ‘ZLB effect’
now manifests itself both earlier and more strongly than in the previous setting of
an exogenous bubble.
19
We can interpret these latter results in terms of the ‘insurance framework’ for
analysing the impact of the ZLB, described in Section 3. Recall that, for bubbles24
whose growth is affected by policy, two alternative forms of insurance against
encountering the ZLB are available to an activist policy-maker: building a buffer
of inﬂation and output against the effects of the bubble’s eventual collapse, by
running policy more loosely than otherwise; or holding down the size of the
bubble, and hence the size of the negative shock it will impart upon bursting, by
running policy more tightly than otherwise.
The fact that the ‘ZLB effect’ in Figure 5 is again downwards shows ﬁrst of all
that, for a Ball-Svensson economy with our baseline parameters and a neutral
nominal interest rate of i
∗ = 3, the former type of insurance must be more
cost-effective than the latter, against a bubble whose growth can be inﬂuenced
by policy according to Equation (16) with φ = 1. As for the observation that this
‘ZLB effect’ is now evident both earlier and more strongly than for an exogenous
bubble, this reﬂects the presence of two added feedbacks in this setting, relative to
the exogenous bubble case – between an activist’s recommendations, on the one
hand, and the structure of Equation (16), on the other.
In more detail, suppose that, in the current setting, an activist is contemplating
recommending looser policy than otherwise, on account of the future risks arising
from the ZLB (as Figure 5 shows he will do). For each basis point by which he
does so, he is aware that this will now have the effect of increasing the expected
growth of the bubble next period, if it survives, by an equal amount. This will
have two competing effects. On the one hand it will partially offset the decrease
in these future risks which he would hope to achieve through the loosening of
policy, and so require him to recommend policy be moved further, to achieve his
optimal level of insurance, than he would in the exogenous bubble case. On the
other, it will provide him with a greater cushion of output and (future) inﬂation
than otherwise, and so reduce the extent of loosening he may feel is required. The
results in Figure 5, which show the magnitude of the ‘ZLB effect’ accelerating
19 Theclaimofastrongereffectisbasedoncomparingthedifferencebetweenthe‘Activist(φ =1,
ZLB)’ and ‘Activist (φ = 1, no ZLB)’ lines in Figure 5, on the one hand, with that between the
‘Activist (ZLB)’ and ‘Activist (no ZLB)’ lines in Figure 2, on the other. Note also that the
caveat expressed in footnote 14 about our earlier results, namely the possibility of our having
inadvertently located local rather than global minima of our activists’ loss functions, continues
to apply. Indeed, if anything, it is likely to apply with even greater force in both this subsection
and (especially) the next, since the ability of policy-makers to inﬂuence the bubble’s behaviour
in these two scenarios would already cause an activist’s expected loss to cease to be a quadratic
function of his contingent policy recommendations, even in the absence of the ZLB.25
over time relative to its size in the exogenous bubble case, suggest that it is the
former feedback which dominates, in the current setting.
Once again, it is interesting to consider the sensitivity of these results to
changes in the assumed steady-state neutral nominal interest rate of the economy.
This is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the difference between the policy
recommendations of activist policy-makers, with and without a zero lower bound
constraint, for i
∗ = 1, 3 and 8 per cent. Here, these activists assume again that
policy can affect the bubble’s growth according to Equation (16) with φ = 1.
Figure 6: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
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Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
We see that, for our baseline Ball-Svensson model, the compounding effect just
described becomes yet more acute if i
∗ is extremely low, so that for i
∗ =1 per cent
the downward ‘ZLB effect’ on an activist’s recommendations is already noticeable
by year 2, and exceeds 1 percentage point by year 4. By contrast, this ‘ZLB effect’
is still negligible, even in year 6, if i
∗ is set to be 8 per cent, well away from zero.26
4.4 Bubbles whose Probability of Bursting is Affected by Policy
Next, instead of a bubble whose growth is affected by policy, consider a bubble
whose period-to-period probability of bursting may be inﬂuenced by the actions
of policy-makers. Speciﬁcally, assume that, by setting tighter (looser) policy this
year, policy-makers can raise (lower) the probability that the bubble will burst next









t , t ≥ 0, denotes the optimal path chosen by a sceptical policy-maker
while the bubble survives, assuming a constant period-to-period probability of
bursting p





∗)) for some ﬁxed sensitivity parameter δ.
We choose this functional form, which was also used in Gruen et al (2003), for
three reasons. First, it ensures that, while raising last year’s interest rate, rt−1,
raises the probability that the bubble will burst this year, pt, it cannot drive




t−1, the benchmark policy settings chosen by the sceptic. Finally, it
has the property that ∂pt/∂(rt−1 −r
∗
t−1) = δ when this derivative is evaluated
at rt−1 = r
∗
t−1, so that the parameter δ gives the marginal sensitivity of the
bubble’s probability of bursting to changes in the real interest rate, at the sceptic’s
benchmark policy settings. For the results which follow we adopt the baseline
choices p
∗ = 0.4, consistent with the bulk of our earlier simulations, and δ = 0.2,
corresponding to a moderate level of interest rate sensitivity.
In this setting, and for an economy with i
∗ = 3, Figure 7 shows a comparison of
the optimal interest rate recommendations of a sceptic and two activists, while the
bubble survives. The two activists differ in the way that their actions are inﬂuenced
by the ZLB: the ﬁrst is constrained by it, while the second is not.
The most striking feature of Figure 7 is that the impact of the ZLB is no longer
in a uniform direction, over time. Up to and including year 4, the effect of the
ZLB on an activist policy-maker is to make them recommend tighter policy than
otherwise. However, in year 5 this shifts, and the effect of the ZLB becomes such
as to cause an activist to recommend looser policy than otherwise, in this and27
Figure 7: Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the Bubble Survives

















































Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates are deviations from neutral.
subsequent years. Moreover, this shift is very dramatic, with the ‘ZLB effect’ on
an activist policy-maker moving from positive 46 basis points in year 4 to negative
178 basis points in year 5.
Once again, we can interpret these results in terms of our ‘insurance framework’
for analysing the impact of the ZLB, described in Section 3. Recall that, as
for bubbles whose growth is affected by policy, in the current setting there are
two alternative forms of insurance against encountering the ZLB available to an
activist policy-maker. The ﬁrst is the standard approach of building a buffer of
extra inﬂation and output against the effects of the bubble’s eventual collapse, by
running policy more loosely than otherwise. The second is to seek to burst the
bubble before it can grow further, and so become a bigger threat to economic
stability whenever it does collapse, by running policy more tightly than otherwise.
The results in Figure 7 show that, in the current setting, the latter type of
insurance must in fact be better value than the former, up to an including28
period 4. However, in year 5 a threshold is crossed. In this year, assuming the
bubble does not burst, an activist policy-maker observes the bubble continuing
to grow to a size of 5 percentage points, at the same time as the sceptic’s policy
settings in previous periods have failed to prepare the economy for the bubble’s
possible future collapse. The combination of these developments sees an activist’s
expected cost-beneﬁt trade-off shift suddenly from seeking to burst the bubble,
by tightening policy, to seeking to cushion the economy against any future bust,
by loosening policy. The decisiveness of the swing from one form of insurance to
the other is, in part, driven by the fact that, in the current setting, any loosening
in current policy increases the chances of the bubble surviving next period and
growing further – so increasing the likelihood, in an activist’s considerations, that
he may have to cope with the collapse of a very large bubble indeed some time
down the track.
20
To see how these ﬁndings change as a function of the economy’s steady-state
neutral nominal interest rate, Figure 8 shows the difference between the policy
recommendations of activist policy-makers, with and without a zero lower bound
constraint, for i
∗ = 1, 3 and 8 per cent. Here, these activists assume again that
policy can affect the bubble’s period-to-period probability of bursting according
to Equation (17) with δ = 0.2.
Interestingly, for the case where i
∗ is extremely low, at 1 per cent, two differences
are apparent relative to the case i
∗ = 3 just discussed. The ﬁrst is that, even in
the early life of the bubble, the ‘ZLB effect’ is now marginally negative. The
second is that the threshold described above, beyond which an activist shifts to
recommending sharply looser policy both than they did in the previous period,
and than they would do in the absence of the ZLB, is now crossed earlier. On the
other hand, we see that for values of i
∗ far from zero, the ‘ZLB effect’ is once
again negligible, even by the time the bubble has been growing for 6 years.
20 The particular form of the function relating the bubble’s probability of bursting next period,
pt+1, to this period’s real interest rate deviation from neutral, rt, will of course also inﬂuence
precisely when this decisive shift in an activist’s policy approach will occur, as well as the exact
magnitude of the swing.29
Figure 8: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
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Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
4.5 Sensitivity to Model Parameters
It is interesting to explore how sensitive the preceding results are to our choice of
model parameters. We focus in particular on the two (positive) parameters β and
λ. The former captures how responsive output is to real interest rates. The latter,
by contrast, captures how ‘naturally self-correcting’ our Ball-Svensson economy
is, absent any policy action.
21
Turning ﬁrst to the case of β, to assess the sensitivity of an activist’s policy
recommendations to the value of this parameter we consider again the baseline
case of an exogenous bubble with constant period-on-period probability of
21 The smaller is λ, the more swiftly will output in the economy rebound towards potential, of
its own accord, following a shock. Conversely, if λ = 1, the economy has no innate propensity
to correct either a positive or negative output gap, once it opens up, so that the full burden of
stabilising the economy falls upon policy-makers setting the real interest rate.30
bursting pt = 0.4 (except p14 = 1), and constant growth in the event that it
does not burst, γt = 1. We then consider the recommendations of activists in two
different economies, each of which has a steady-state neutral nominal interest rate
of 3 per cent, but which differ in their responsiveness to real interest rates – with
values of β = 0.5, and 1 respectively.
22
Figure 9: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
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Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
We ﬁnd that, for an economy with lower responsiveness, the impact of the ZLB
on an activist policy-maker’s recommendations is correspondingly greater, when
faced with an exogenous bubble. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows the
difference between the policy recommendations of activist policy-makers, with
and without a ZLB constraint, in the two economies.
The direction of this result is unsurprising, since the capacity of policy to stabilise
the economy following a large negative shock to output is weaker, the smaller is
22 All other model and loss function parameters are assumed to take their baseline values: α =0.4,
λ = 0.8 and µ = 1.0.31
β. Hence, the activist in our β = 0.5 economy is commensurately more anxious,
in each period, to begin building a buffer of added inﬂation and output against the
bubble’s eventual collapse, than his counterpart in the β = 1 economy.
What is perhaps surprising is the magnitude of this sensitivity, with the ‘ZLB
effect’ exceeding 1 percentage point as early as period 4, in the economy with
β = 0.5. By contrast, in the β = 1 economy, the corresponding ‘ZLB effect’ is
still negligible in period 4, and only reaches 26 basis points in period 6.
23
Correspondingly, to assess the sensitivity of an activist’s policy recommendations
to the value of λ, we consider the same baseline case of an exogenous bubble
with constant period-on-period probability of bursting pt = 0.4 (except p14 = 1),
and constant growth in the event that it does not burst, γt = 1. Now, however,
we consider the recommendations of activists in three different economies, each
of which again has a steady-state neutral nominal interest rate of 3 per cent, but
which this time differ in the degree to which output is naturally self-correcting in
each – with values of λ = 0.6, 0.8 and 1 respectively.
24
In terms of our insurance framework for assessing the likely impact of the ZLB on
an activist’s recommendations, we would expect this impact to be greatest in the
economy with λ = 1.0, and smallest in that with λ = 0.6.
25 This is indeed what
23 In the β = 0.5 economy the ‘ZLB effect’ is sufﬁciently strong that, if the bubble were to
survive this long, an activist policy-maker’s recommendations would actually reach the zero
lower bound by year 7.
24 Here we revert to the assumption that β = 1 in all three economies, with the parameters α and
µ again at their baseline values of 0.4 and 1.
25 Policy-makers in the λ = 0.6 economy can expect considerable assistance in restoring output
to potential, whenever the bubble bursts, from the economy’s natural tendency to rebound from
suchashock.Bycontrast,intheλ =1.0economy,policy-makerscanexpectnosuchassistance,
and so will wish to take out commensurately more insurance against the possible effects of the
bubble’s future collapse. The same conclusion can be reached more formally in terms of the
phase diagram for the Ball-Svensson model discussed in Section 3, and derived in Appendix B.
It may readily be checked that, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, increasing the value of λ makes the slopes of
both the boundary lines separating Regions I, II and III more negative. Hence, increasing λ
brings both Regions II and III, which an activist policy-maker wishes to stay away from, closer
to the origin in (yt,πt)-space – and so increases the incentive for such an activist to recommend
looser policy than otherwise, to shift the economy upwards and to the right, away from these
danger zones.32
we ﬁnd, as illustrated in Figure 10, which shows the difference between the policy
recommendations of activist policy-makers, with and without a ZLB constraint,
in each of our three economies. This time, however, the variation in the impact
of the ZLB across our three economies is not substantial, at least until the bubble
has grown very large, which suggests that our earlier results are fairly robust to
plausible changes in the value of λ.
26
Figure 10: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations













































Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have used a simple, two equation model of a closed economy,
augmented with an asset-price bubble, to investigate what impact the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates has on the recommendations of an activist
26 Although we do not show them here, the same point may be seen by directly comparing
the successive policy recommendations of activist and sceptical policy-makers in our three
economies, while the bubble survives.33
policy-maker, attempting to respond optimally to a given bubble. In assessing our
results, it should be remembered that this framework almost certainly magniﬁes
the impact of the ZLB, most notably because it does not allow for other arms
of policy (or unconventional monetary policy operations) to help extricate the
economy from a situation in which policy has become constrained by the ZLB.
For example, the possibility of encountering the ZLB in the future would clearly
hold fewer fears for monetary policy-makers in an economy with sound public
ﬁnances, than in one burdened with high net public debt and persistent deﬁcits. In
the former, policy-makers would be aware that ﬁscal policy could be called upon,
ifnecessary,toaidinstimulatingtheeconomyandforestallinganyriskofdeﬂation
becoming entrenched.
27 Likewise, our closed economy setting precludes the use
– as advocated for Japan by numerous authors, such as Svensson (2001) and
McCallum (2000) – of exchange rate policy as a tool to help rescue an economy
suffering from the effects of a severe asset-price bubble collapse.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our framework has the twin advantages of
simplicity and transparency, while at the same time realistically capturing the
key elements of the interaction between output, inﬂation and real interest rates.
It thus allows us to draw plausible conclusions regarding at least the direction in
which the presence of the ZLB would likely inﬂuence the recommendations of
an activist policy-maker, trying to respond optimally to a bubble. It also allows
us to understand intuitively the mechanisms driving these conclusions, and how
the relative importance of these mechanisms might vary as we alter either the
stochastic properties of the bubble, or the parameters which characterise the
economy.
Table 1 summarises the results from our various numerical simulations, for the
case of an economy with a steady-state neutral nominal interest rate of i
∗ =
3 per cent. For each scenario the table shows, as time proceeds and the bubble
27 This is not to say that, in an economy with sound public ﬁnances, policy-makers would
be unconcerned about the possibility of encountering the ZLB, since any requirement for
bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal stimulus would result in the accumulation of net debt which must
subsequently be repaid (and which might also entail undesirable intergenerational transfers).
Rather, it is to say that they would likely assess the costs of encountering the ZLB to be far
lower than is implied in our framework. This would be especially so in the ‘deﬂationary trap’
region of (yt,πt)-space, from much of which it would now be possible to escape with the aid of
ﬁscal stimulus, so avoiding the catastrophic losses associated with a deﬂationary spiral.34
grows, whether the impact of the ZLB on an activist’s recommendations would be
to make to make them tighter (+), looser (−) or little different (=) than otherwise
(where ‘little different’ here denotes an impact of less than 25 basis points).
Table 1: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
Tighter (+), looser (−), or little different (=) than otherwise, i* = 3.0
Scenario Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Policy can’t affect bubble
pt = 0.2, baseline model = = = − − −
pt = 0.4, baseline model = = = = = −
pt = 0.4, β = 0.5 = = − − − −
pt = 0.4, λ = 0.6 = = = = = =
pt = 0.4, λ = 1.0 = = = = − −
Policy affects bubble growth = = = = − −
Policy affects probability of bursting
p
∗ = 0.4, δ = 0.2 = = + + − −
There are two broad sets of lessons worth highlighting from this summary. The
ﬁrst concerns the appropriate level of the steady-state neutral nominal interest rate
– the sum of the economy’s neutral real interest rate and policy-makers’ choice
of target inﬂation rate. From Table 1 we see that, even for a very low neutral
nominal interest rate of i
∗ = 3 per cent, in most scenarios the ZLB has relatively
little effect on the thinking of an activist policy-maker until the bubble has become
quite large.
28 Moreover, as Figures 3, 6 and 8 conﬁrm, even those ‘ZLB effects’ in
Table 1 which are not negligible dissipate rapidly as the neutral nominal interest
rate is raised above 3 per cent.
These observations suggest that fears of encountering the ZLB should not be
overstated, unless the neutral nominal interest rate in the economy is very low.
They thus have an obvious implication for policy-makers anxious not to have to
worry about factoring the ZLB into their thinking, when trying to cope with an
asset-price bubble. Such policy-makers should simply avoid targeting too low an
28 The two exceptions are: when the bubble’s probability of bursting may be inﬂuenced by policy;
and when the bubble is exogenous but the economy is relatively unresponsive to policy-makers’
actions. In these two cases the ‘ZLB effect’ exceeds 25 basis points when the bubble is still only
of a moderate size.35
inﬂation rate, so as to ensure that the economy’s neutral nominal interest rate is in
turn not too low – say, not below 4 per cent, for our stylised, baseline economy.
29
The results in Table 1 also shed light on how the ZLB ought optimally to affect
the recommendations of an activist policy-maker, facing an asset-price bubble, for
a given target inﬂation rate. We may interpret these results through the ‘insurance’
framework for analysing the impact of the ZLB on an activist’s thinking, described
in Section 3.
As discussed there in detail, there are three forms of ‘insurance’ which a
policy-maker can take out against the risk of encountering the ZLB due to the
future bursting of an asset-price bubble. Two of these – to attempt to deﬂate the
bubble before it can grow further, or to restrain its future growth – are available
only if policy-makers can inﬂuence the future behaviour of the bubble. The third,
to build a buffer of extra inﬂation and output against its future collapse, is always
available to policy-makers.
The results in Table 1 (together with those shown in Figures 3, 6 and 8) suggest
that, for the scenarios we have considered, the third form of insurance is typically
the most cost-effective, even where the ﬁrst two are available. However, this is
not uniformly so – and, for different scenarios, which form of insurance is most
cost-effective seems to depend delicately upon the parameters describing both the
economy and the stochastic properties of the bubble. Indeed, in some instances,
such as when policy-makers can inﬂuence a bubble’s probability of bursting, it
appears that the form of insurance which represents the best value for an activist
can even switch suddenly and decisively from one period to the next. Overall,
therefore, whether the ZLB should cause policy-makers to operate policy more
tightly or more loosely than they would otherwise do, while a bubble is growing,
would seem to be a subtle question – even after abstracting from the signiﬁcant
informational difﬁculties facing policy-makers in practice.
29 Hence, for example, a target inﬂation range with a mid-point of 1 per cent might well be too
low for such policy-makers, in our baseline economy, unless the neutral real interest rate in
their economy were thought to exceed 3 per cent.36
Appendix A: Recent Literature
This paper lies at the intersection of two broad areas, both of which have been the
subject of extensive research interest in recent years.
The ﬁrst relates to the issue of how monetary policy should respond to asset price
bubbles. Work in this area has focussed on whether policy-makers ought to make
allowance for perceived asset price misalignments in setting policy; and, if so,
whether such allowance ought to be explicit, through the inclusion of asset prices
in either the policy-maker’s objective function or policy rule, or merely implicit.
30
A related issue, which has also received recent attention, is whether success in
achieving low and stable inﬂation may, in fact, increase either the frequency with
which asset price misalignments develop, or the severity of such misalignments
(Borio and Lowe 2002).
The second broad research area relates to the implications, both for the economy
and for monetary policy, of deﬂation and the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates. An initial wave of interest in these implications was prompted by Japan’s
experiences with both phenomena, starting around the late 1990s. Since then,
such research has gained renewed impetus recently from concerns that some other
major economies, such as the US and Germany, might have been ﬂirting with
deﬂation, following signiﬁcant economic downturns.
Within this second broad area, the literature to date may be roughly divided into
two streams. The ﬁrst of these consists of theoretical analyses of the policy issues
raised by deﬂation and the zero lower bound. These issues include the causes
and implications of a liquidity trap, and the role (if any) of foreign exchange
or asset market interventions in escaping from such a trap (see, for example,
Svensson (2001) and McCallum (2000)). They also encompass the costs and
beneﬁts of co-ordinated ﬁscal and monetary policy actions, such as ‘helicopter
drops’ (Bernanke 2000), or of other more abstract policy options such as Gesell
taxes on money balances (Goodfriend 2000), designed to extricate an economy
from deﬂation. Finally, they also include the role (if any) of the choice of
monetary policy regime – and in particular the decision whether or not to adopt a
30 For the two opposing views in this debate see Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000).37
price-levelorinﬂationtarget–inalsohelpinganeconomytoescapefromdeﬂation
(Krugman 1998).
The second stream consists of empirical or historical examinations of these same
issues. Such examinations have primarily focussed on the experiences of Japan
since the early 1990s (see, for example, Posen (2003) and Fukao (2003)), but
also include re-examinations of other relevant episodes, such as the attempt by
US authorities in the 1960s to increase liquidity, and lower long-term bond rates,
through ‘Operation Twist’ (see Modigliani and Sutch (1966)).
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As noted earlier, this paper lies at the overlap between the two broad research areas
just described. From this viewpoint, the asset-price bubbles in this paper may be
regarded, at one level, as just one particular source of shocks with the potential –
especially if inﬂation is being held at too low a level prior to such a shock – to
drive the economy to a state where the zero lower bound becomes a constraint on
policy. The experiences of Japan in the early 1990s, and of the US more recently,
suggest that this is certainly an important area for current research.
Thereisanimportantdifference,however,betweenourfocusinthispaper,andthat
of the bulk of the literature on deﬂation and the zero lower bound just described.
The greater part of that literature concentrates on the economic implications of
the zero lower bound, and on what policy-makers should do to escape from this
constraint, once it has been reached. By contrast, our concern in this paper is
with the ways in which the existence of the zero lower bound ought to inﬂuence
policy-makers prior to any negative shock – in our setting, caused by the collapse
of a bubble – which might drive the economy into recession and deﬂation.
31 Of course, the distinction between these two streams is to some extent artiﬁcial, since many
studies have included both a theoretical and empirical component.38
Appendix B: The Phase Diagram for the Ball-Svensson Model
under Optimal Policy
In this appendix we outline the derivation of the phase diagram (Figure 1)
discussed in Section 3 of the main body of the paper. This phase diagram is
replicated in Figure A1 below, now for the case of general model and loss function
























































































Notes: Dotted lines with arrows denote sample trajectories for the evolution of (yt,πt), absent
future shocks to output or inﬂation, in the event that the nominal interest rate is held
at zero. Line 1 passes through the point (0,−i
∗) and has slope ((1−λ)−((1−λ)
2 +
4αβ)
1/2)/2β. Line 2 passes through the point (0,−(β/β +q)i
∗) and has slope −(λ +
αq)/(β +q), where q is the scalar deﬁned earlier (see p. 7).39
parameters α, β, λ and µ. Note that this phase diagram represents a particular
case of that derived previously, by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), for the
Ball-Svensson model with policy determined by a general Taylor Rule.
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The basic idea of this phase diagram is that we can
separate (yt,πt)-space into three distinct components, as follows:
(yt,πt)-space
       
HHHHHHH j
Part in which the economy will enter a
deﬂationary spiral (DS), in the absence of
future shocks to output or inﬂation, even
with the nominal interest rate set to zero
(Region III)
Part in which the economy will not enter a
deﬂationary spiral (Non-DS), in the absence
of future shocks to output or inﬂation, if the
nominal interest rate is set to zero





Part of the Non-DS Region in
which the zero lower bound will
initially be binding, under optimal
policy to restore the economy to
steady state (Region II)
Part of the Non-DS Region in which,
absent future shocks, optimal policy
will be able to restore the economy
to steady state without ever striking
the zero lower bound (Region I)
We begin by establishing the existence and properties of Region III. To this end
observe that, in the absence of future shocks to output or inﬂation, the evolution
of our Ball-Svensson economy may be described, in terms of nominal interest
rates, by the system
Zt = MZt−1−βXt (B1)




















32 Here we consider only the case where policy is set optimally, which turns out to be a speciﬁc
instance of a Taylor Rule – see Equation (12). For an alternative discussion of this phase
diagram from that provided here, see Reifschneider and Williams (2000).40
Now consider the question: what initial conditions for Z would result in the
economy entering a deﬂationary spiral, even in the event that i
lvl were held at the
zero lower bound? To answer this question note that, for i
lvl = 0, Equation (B1)
may be re-written more simply as
Wt = MWt−1 (B3)
where Wt denotes the vector Wt = (yt,πt +i
∗)
T. Then, for this simpliﬁed system,
the evolution of any initialWt is clearly determined simply by the eigenvalues, ξ±,



















Note that, for α,β,λ >0, then ξ+ will clearly satisfy ξ+ >1; while ξ− will satisfy
0 < ξ− < 1 provided λ > αβ (which certainly holds for our baseline choice of
model parameters: α = 0.4, β = 1 and λ = 0.8).
Hence, translating back to (yt,πt)-coordinates, we see that (yt,πt)-space may be
split into two halves, in one of which the economy will enter a deﬂationary spiral
even with nominal interest rates set to zero, as shown in Figure A1. The line
separating these two halves passes through the point (0,−i
∗), and has slope equal






slope is approximately −0.54 for our baseline choice of model parameters.
In addition, the non-deﬂationary-spiral component of (yt,πt)-space may itself be
subdivided into two parts: one where the zero lower bound will initially be binding
on optimal policy (Region II); and one (Region I) where it will not be binding (so
that, absent future shocks, the economy may be returned to steady-state without
ever setting nominal interest rates to zero).
The dividing line between these two regions will simply be given by the set of
states (yt,πt) for which the associated unconstrained optimal nominal interest
rate recommendation exactly equals zero. Yet we know that, for any given levels41

























−1(β +q)πt = 0 (B7)









Note that this passes through the point (0,−(β/β +q)i
∗) and has slope −(λ +
αq)/(β +q), as shown in Figure A1.
This completes the derivation, for general model and loss function parameters, of
the phase diagram for the Ball-Svensson model under optimal policy.
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33 Whilewedonotpursuethisfurtherhere,itisalsopossibletousethisphasediagram(FigureB1)
to better understand the precise way in which being in Region II will result in additional loss
for a policy-maker, over and above that which they would expect to incur in the absence of the
ZLB. The key observation is that, without the ZLB, our Ball-Svensson economy will evolve
under optimal policy according to the equation Zt = UZt−1 where U is a 2×2 matrix with
eigenvalues 0 and (1−αq). Computation of the corresponding eigenvectors, which turn out to
be (1 −α)
T and (q −1)
T respectively, allows the way in which optimal policy moves the
economy around in (yt,πt)-space to be easily pictured – and hence, in turn, allows the impact
of the ZLB on a policy-maker, trying to stabilise an economy in Region II, to be understood
geometrically in terms of the phase diagram.42
Appendix C: The Case of Rational Bubbles
For the baseline results presented in Section 4.1, the asset-price bubble considered
there grew at a uniform rate, γt = 1, and had a probability of collapse which was
constant through time. However, under certain assumptions about the relationship
between the price growth underlying an asset bubble and the impact of that bubble
on the real economy, such a bubble could be regarded as irrational: that is, in
violation of an arbitrage condition ruling out unexploited proﬁt opportunities in
the assets whose price rises constitute the bubble.
34
As in Gruen et al (2003), we do not see this as a shortcoming per se, since
there is much evidence in developed economies of irrational bubbles occurring
in practice – see, for example, Shiller (2000). Nevertheless, it is interesting to
consider whether the imposition of a rationality assumption on our bubbles would
affect our overall ﬁndings and, if so, how.
To address this question we must ﬁrst quantify what it means for a bubble to be
rational. Such a bubble arises from the actions of a rational investor who buys the
relevant assets up to the point at which expected proﬁts are driven to zero.
35 If
the probability of collapse is constant, p
∗, and the capital gain to the investor in
year t +1 if the bubble collapses is −at, then a rational risk-neutral investor will
be indifferent to holding the asset when the expected growth of the bubble, if it
survives, is Dat+1 = atp
∗/(1−p
∗). This is a geometrically growing bubble, rather
than the constant-growth bubble that constituted our baseline case.
36
34 The required assumptions are that the effect on the output gap of a change in asset prices is
proportional to the size of the change, and that rational investors and the activist policymaker
agree on the exact stochastic details of the bubble. We adopt these two assumptions throughout
the remainder of this appendix.
35 We assume that the assets yield an annual return equal to the real interest rate, so that the
expected proﬁt relative to holding one-year government bonds is determined by the expected
capital gain on the assets.
36 This geometric growth formula for Dat+1 is simply another way of stating the arbitrage
condition that deﬁnes a rational bubble, namely that the bubble’s expected growth over the
next year, EtDat+1, should be zero. Note also that, if the probability of collapse is not constant,
a rational bubble need not grow at a constant geometrical rate.43
Havingquantiﬁedtheconditionforanexogenousbubbletoberational,wearenow
in a position to examine whether the imposition of a rationality assumption on our
bubbles would fundamentally alter our earlier ﬁndings as to the impact of the ZLB
on the recommendations of an activist policy-maker. To this end, Figure C1 shows
the difference between the recommendations of activist policy-makers, with and
without a ZLB constraint, for the case of a rational bubble with size 1 in period
0, and with constant probability of bursting p
∗ = 0.2.
37 Results are shown for the
three cases i
∗ = 1, 3 and 8 per cent.
Figure C1: Impact of the ZLB on an Activist’s Recommendations
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Notes: The sceptic implements policy in each year.
37 The assumption that the bubble has size 1 in period 0 (with y0 also assumed equal to 1,
consistent with the scenario that the bubble has spontaneously developed in period 0, thereby
perturbing the economy from the equilibrium state it occupied in the preceding period) is made
so as to allow the rational bubble to ‘get started’. Since the rationality condition Dat+1 =
atp
∗/(1− p
∗) may equivalently be written as at+1 = at/(1− p
∗), we see that without such
an assumption a rational bubble would never be able to develop in the ﬁrst place.44
Strikingly, we see that the results in Figure C1 for this rational bubble are
extremely similar to those shown earlier in Figure 3, for our (irrational) baseline
scenario.
38 This strongly suggests that the general thrust of our various ﬁndings in
Section 4, regarding the impact of the ZLB on the recommendations of an activist
policy-maker,isunlikelytobesensitivetotheimpositionofarationalityconstraint
on the bubbles considered there.
39
38 The extreme closeness of this similarity is to some extent coincidental, since the constant
period-to-period probability of bursting is different for the two bubbles: p
∗ = 0.4 for the
baseline bubble considered in Figure 3, versus p
∗ = 0.2 for the rational bubble considered
in Figure C1 above. Were we to assume also p
∗ = 0.4 for the rational bubble, the growth of
this bubble would accelerate so much more quickly, while it survived, than in the p
∗ = 0.2
case, that the downward impact of the ZLB on an activist’s policy recommendations would be
evident both much earlier and more strongly than in Figure C1. The important point, however,
is that the general nature of this impact – namely to push down the optimal recommendations
of an activist, and to do so increasingly strongly over time – would be unchanged.
39 This is not to say that, for an activist policy-maker, the recommendations themselves (whether
subject to a ZLB constraint or not) would be similar for the two different bubbles just compared:
the baseline bubble in Section 4.1 and the rational bubble speciﬁed above. Indeed, the results
in Section 3 of Gruen et al (2003) show that these recommendations would, in fact, be quite
different. Rather, it merely says that, in terms of the marginal impact which the ZLB would
have on the optimal recommendations of an activist policy-maker, the general nature of this
impact is similar for both types of bubble.45
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